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ABSTRACT: The paper has two objectives: to introduce the fundamentals of a triplet 
model of a concept, and to show that the main concept models may be structurally 
treated as its partial cases. The triplet model considers a concept as a mental repre-
sentation and characterizes it from three interrelated perspectives. The first deals 
with objects (and their attributes of various orders) subsumed under a concept. The 
second focuses on representing structures that depict objects and their attributes in 
some intelligent system. The third concentrates on the ways of establishing corre-
spondences between objects with their attributes and appropriate representing struc-
tures.  
Keywords: concepts, models of concepts, triplet description of concept models. 
 
 
CONTENTS 
1. Introduction 
2. The Extended Notion of a Representation  
3. The Fundamentals of the Triplet Modeling of Concepts  
4. Ontological Structuring and Its Explication 
5. The Base of a Concept 
6. The Representing Part of a Concept  
7. The Linkage of a Concept  
8. The Triplet Model of a Concept 
9. Structures Associated with a Concept in the Triplet Model 
10. The triplet components of the main concept models in cognitive psychology  
11. Perspectives 
Bibliography 
 
1. Introduction  
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For the sake of simplicity, we consider only models of so-called object 
concepts like HORSE, STAR and ROBIN. However, with minor reserva-
tions our approach may be applied to "abstract" concepts like attribute 
concepts (RED, BLACK, SIZE) and relational concepts (LOVE, FORCE, 
DISTANCE).  
 Concepts have been the objects of much concentrated attention in 
cognitive science and cognitive psychology (Barsalou and Medin 1986, 
Cohen and Murphy 1984, Komatsu 1992, Smith 1988, Smith and Medin 
1981). It was found that concepts are not formless and simple entities and 
cannot be equated with the names, lists of attributes, meanings, or simple 
units of information. To understand concepts scientists have been elabo-
rating models of concepts. Their common feature is that they describe 
different collections of empirical data about the usage of ordinary con-
cepts in recognition and classification of objects.  
 It seems that a particular concept model is suitable for explaining out-
comes of a certain empirical study of a definite kind of concept. From 
this point of view, each model has some empirical confirmation. How-
ever, changing either the empirical condition or conceptual kind has, as a 
rule, led to building new concept models. This strategy should be sup-
plemented by revealing certain hypothetical structure that may serve as a 
basis for the unified treatment of concept models. This theoretical work 
grounds on the following circumstance. All concept models assume that 
in order to specify a concept we should specify attributes (properties, 
relations, functions) of objects subsumed under a concept. The models 
proposed differ in the assumptions about the nature and descriptions of 
these constitutive specifying attributes.  
 In any case, every model associates with concepts certain structures 
defined on constitutive attributes. We interpret these structures as sub-
structures of some hypothetical and general underlying structure of con-
cepts. With regard to its maturity, nature, and context of application, each 
kind of concept reveals or actualizes specific substructures of this under-
lying structure. We do not pretend that this underlying structure exists in 
mental or other reality. It is only a hypothetical construct effective under 
the unified treatment of available concept models. 
 The first objective of the paper is to introduce the general underlying 
structure of concepts and to describe semi-formally its substructures. We 
use the name "triplet" for calling this structure and the corresponding 
concept model. The second objective is to show which substructures of 
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the triplet structure are being actualized in several concept models in the 
current cognitive psychology.  
2. The Extended Notion of a Representation  
Many cognitive scientists and psychologists have treated a concept as a 
mental representation. In turn, the notion of a representation is taken from 
the formal mathematical theories of representation (Krantz, Luce, Sup-
pes, and Tversky 1971). According to this notion, we should distinguish 
the domain being represented, D, from a representational model, R of D. 
Often, D is a part of the actual world, and R is some scientific theory 
about D. ... R represents D, if every object in D has a corresponding 
name in R, and every relation in D has a corresponding relation symbol 
in R. Normally, R uses numeric relations (greater than, equal to, etc.), 
whereas D's relations are based on actual properties of the objects (mass, 
velocity, intelligence) (Cohen and Murphy 1984, p. 31).  
 This notion fits well with the context of measurement when the main 
task is to assign definite numeric values to attributes of objects. However, 
it appears that the notion of a representation associated with the expres-
sion "mental representation" is more complicated. Indeed, the mental 
apparatus in which a mental representation takes place operates not only 
with names of objects and symbols of relations, but also with other repre-
senting structures. Their examples are images, descriptions (in particular, 
definitions) and mental models of objects and their attributes. By the 
way, numbers and numerical structures are the simplest mathematical 
structures used in science for the reality representation. Additionally, the 
information about the domain D concerns both objects from D and their 
attributes. Thus, we need a more realistic notion of a representation. 
Without going into details, we will keep its following version.  
 Under this version, first, any representation takes place in certain con-
ditions K (it is built by a particular subject and by specific tools; it fulfills 
a definite task, etc.) Second, in any case a representation does not repre-
sent completely the domain. It makes this only partially with some degree 
of precision. Third, to study the domain we usually split it into objects. 
This splitting (partition) is not an absolute, but a relative procedure in 
respect to both objects and their attributes. Depending on conditions, 
available and accessible knowledge, we separate in D different sets of 
objects and various collections of their attributes. Fourth, there are many 
representing structures. The most important of them are informal and 
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formal models of attributes and finally models of objects as some bundles 
of attributes. Fifth, one consequence of allowing for many representing 
structures (not only names) is introducing relationships between D and 
representing structures other than naming relations. Examples are model-
ing relations between entities being modeled and their models.  
 From this it follows, that the extended notion of a representation ℜ 
may be described as the triple (D(DK, PK(DK), EK(DK)), rK,      RepKT(N, 
M)). Here K is conditions in which a representation takes place. D(DK, 
PK(DK), EK(DK)) symbolizes the partition of D in the set of objects DK 
with the collection PK(DK) of properties and the ensemble EK(DK) of 
relations among objects. RepKT(N, M) symbolizes the system of names N 
and models M that is built and analyzed by means of certain cognitive 
system (language, knowledge system, theory) T. The correspondence rK 
is such that (a) every object d from DK, its every property from PK(DK) 
and every relation from EK(DK) have specific names from N; (b) some 
objects and some of their attributes have their appropriate models from M 
that contain and organize the certain relevant information about them. 
The models are constructed and analyzed by means of T.  
 It should be noted that in analyzing the extended notion of a represen-
tation, we deal directly not with its components (objects, representing 
structures and correspondence between them), but with the information 
about them. It may have different degrees of completeness, formality, 
precision, justification, certainty, confidence, etc.  
3. The Fundamentals of the Triplet Modeling of Concepts  
Considering a concept as a special mental representation, we characterize 
it from three interrelated perspectives. The first one deals with objects 
(and their attributes of various orders) subsumed under a concept. The 
second one operates with structures that represent objects and their at-
tributes in some intelligent system. The third perspective deals with the 
ways of establishing correspondences between objects (and their attrib-
utes) and their representing structures.  
 Thus, we have the three structured and differently ordered kinds of 
information associated with these perspectives. The first information is 
organized around the ontological hypotheses about the concept domain 
(concept extension), i.e., on what a concept is about. The second informa-
tion is organized according to the rules, resources and history of 
representative and communicative systems, primarily natural and 
 5 
sentative and communicative systems, primarily natural and artificial 
languages and knowledge systems. The third information has centered on 
the relationships between the concept domain and the available represen-
tative and communicative systems. These relationships are not simple 
one-to-one correspondences between the elements of the former and 
structures of the latter. Many peculiar operations and processes have con-
tributed to generating these correspondences.  
 According to the triplet approach, the hypothetical triplet structure and 
its substructures connected with these kinds of information are modeled 
by means of sets of different kinds, set scales, and abstract properties. 
Using these constructions, the triplet model has uniformly described most 
of the various concept characteristics introduced by other models.  
4. Ontological Structuring and Its Explication 
Ontologically, we assume that the concept domain consists of objects and 
their attributes. We also take for granted that an object and its attributes 
determine each other. How these assumptions may be expressed on the 
level of modeling objects and their attributes? We will consider names (in 
a broad sense not only "ordinary" names may function as names, but also 
descriptions and definitions) of objects and their attributes as their "pri-
mary" models.  
 In a first approximation, the "secondary" models of objects and attrib-
utes may be described as follows. Let us begin from secondary models of 
attributes. We suppose that these models contain necessarily names of 
objects that may possess the attribute in question. Additional require-
ments to the secondary models of attributes will be given below. If we 
have the secondary models of object attributes, then the secondary mod-
els of an object itself may be considered as a specific composition of sec-
ondary models of their attributes.  
 From this it follows, that we may treat a model of the concept domain 
as an interrelated system of primary and secondary models of objects and 
their attributes. Is it possible to describe this model in the uniform and 
manageable way?  
 Usually, the treatment of a concept starts from the naming and de-
scription of objects subsumed under it. These objects may have real, 
ideal, or mental nature. However, naming is only the first step in the ob-
ject study. Since the origin of modern science the leading strategy of in-
vestigating objects is the finding and describing of their attributes and 
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also the establishing and describing of relationships between them. This 
means that the reasonable description of any object should contain infor-
mation about, at least several, its attributes of the first order. Occasion-
ally, this description contains also information about attributes of higher 
orders like attributes of attributes of objects, attributes of relations be-
tween objects, relations between attributes of objects, etc. Again, this 
information is expressed by means of primary and secondary models of 
these entities.  
 Traditionally, in concept studies objects, their sets and attributes of 
various orders have been taken intuitively and informally without corre-
sponding them to some precise and easy analyzable models. One possible 
way of explicating this situation is to use the set-theoretical constructions 
of abstract property (Burgin 1985; Burgin and Kuznetsov 1993) and 
some generalization of Bourbaki's set scale (Bourbaki 1968; Burgin and 
Kuznetsov 1986).  
 Previously we denoted the set of objects subsumed (in the conditions 
K) under a concept as DK. Let us take also into account that (i) an attrib-
ute is an attribute of some object(s); (ii) an attribute, as a rule, has some 
set of its values and (iii) there are usually some procedures of assigning a 
specific value of an attribute to a particular object. This minimal list of 
constraints on the notion of an attribute may be taken as the foundation 
for constructing its model as an abstract property.  
 An abstract property P(DK) as a model of an attribute of objects DK is 
a triple (DK, p, Sc). Here DK is a set of objects c that may possess the 
attribute in question. A scale Sc is a set of possible values of an attribute. 
A partial function p symbolizes a procedure(s) of assigning the definite 
attribute value(s) (the element(s) p(c) = sc ∈ Sc) to the object c ∈ DK. 
 The construction of an abstract property may also function for model-
ing relations between objects from DK. Here we take instead of DK the 
direct product DK ⊗ DK and speak of so-called abstract relational two-
placed property P2(DK ⊗ DK) of DK. In such a manner, it is possible to 
model as abstract properties attributes of any order and arity connected 
with DK.  
 For example, the relation between physical bodies called "distance" 
may be modeled as a two-placed abstract property in the following man-
ner. Here DK ⊗ DK is the direct product of the set of all physical bodies 
by itself, Sc is the some numerical 3-dimensional coordinate system, and 
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p is realized by some procedures for determining the values of distance 
for any pair of bodies from DK.  
 The construction of an abstract property allows us to distinguish sys-
tematically between the attribute and its values. Informally, all objects 
possessing an attribute are identical in respect to it. However, we usually 
differentiate these objects by values of this attribute. Sometimes values of 
an attribute may have structure of another attribute. We will not touch 
further this point here. Moreover, this construction allows us to distin-
guish between various orders attributes of objects under consideration. 
Often we need not only attributes of the first order, but also the attributes 
of the former attributes. For example, the attribute weight has such an 
attribute of the second order as to be positive.  
 Let us consider the construction of the set scale. 
 We build the set scale S(X) by the stepwise application of operations 
of set union, set product and constructing the power-set to its basis X. The 
basis is a collection of sets X1, X2,..., Xn. We obtain the definite level of 
the set scale on each step. Any such level consists of some sets. The set 
scale S(X) is the union of all its levels. 
 We use levels of a set scale for distinguishing attributes of various 
orders. For instance, the abstract property distance may be associated 
with one level of the set scale S(X = {DK⊗DK, Sc}). The positiveness of 
distance is associated with other level of this scale.  
 The collection of object attributes has a systemic nature in the follow-
ing sense. Changing the attributes of the n-th order (for example, intro-
ducing new scales), we change also and the attributes of higher than n-th 
orders.  
 Let us take for example such a property of material bodies as weight. 
We may use the set {light, middle, heavy} as its scale and consider such a 
relation between bodies as to be heavier than. Evidently, we may take as 
the scale for this relation the set {(middle, light), (heavy, middle), (heavy, 
light)}. This means that the relation to be heavier than is hold between all 
middle bodies and all light bodies, etc. However, taking the set of all ra-
tional numbers as the scale for the property weight, we obtain another 
scale for the relation in question and therefore, in a sense, change it.  
 Thus, speaking about an object c, we consider also its attributes, at 
least that which we supposed to be relevant in a concrete situation. It 
means that we should associate with the concept C of objects {...,c,...} the 
knowledge not only about c, but also about c's attributes.  
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 To avoid undesirable associations from here on we shall use, if neces-
sary, capital bold symbols, letters, words, word combinations for denot-
ing concepts. Instances are C, ROBIN and SMALL BIRD. We will name 
objects falling under a concept as c, robin and small bird. Correspond-
ingly, the names of a concept might be "C", "ROBIN", and "SMALL 
BIRD". The names of the objects subsumed under a concept might be 
"c", "robin" and "small bird". Generally, as names or terms of a concept 
may function not only lexically simple names, but also compound names, 
sentences, and even texts.  
 A concept C has, as a rule, many names of the kind N(C). The same is 
true for the objects falling under a concept. The names differ in their ex-
actness, effectiveness, simplicity and other characteristics. There are 
many relationships between the various names of the "same" concept and 
between the various names of the "same" object falling under a concept.  
 Moreover, in many contexts we do not systematically and explicitly 
differentiate between an object and its names. We frequently identify 
such an "entity" as a concept not only with some of its names, but also 
with some names of objects falling under it. In our notation it means that, 
metaphorically, C = "C" = "c" = c.  
 A given concept C informs us only about specific elements or subsets 
of the universe of discourse U. Any such informing takes place in some 
conditions K. Aside from describing these conditions in details, we men-
tion only that they have been associated with the individual's mental and 
interpretative abilities, skills and tools, available knowledge, purposes, 
and even psychic state. 
5. The Base of a Concept 
Bearing previously mentioned distinctions and conventions in mind, we 
introduce the following definition.  
Definition 1. Under the conditions K the potential ground set GK(C) ⊆ U 
of the concept C is the set of all elements g ∈ U reasonably denoted by 
the name NK(C) of the concept C.  
 We usually say that element g ∈ GK(C) falls or subsumes under the 
concept C.  
 Under the traditional logical treatment, the terms "extension" and 
"volume" have been frequently used for labeling the ground set of a con-
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cept. The term "category" is in use in cognitive science and psychology. 
Here we also call elements from GK(C) "instances" or "exemplars" of a 
concept.  
 Associating the ground set with a concept is only a first step in its trip-
let modeling. On the one hand, the specifying of the concept C presup-
poses also the possibility of indicating and describing, at least, qualita-
tively some constitutive attributes of elements from GK(C). This means 
that the information about such attributes is an important characterization 
of a concept. As a rule, the set of these constitutive attributes is called 
"intension" or "content" of a concept. On the other hand, not every object 
labeled by the name NK(C) relates to the concept C. In particular, we may 
apply an inappropriate name. An object should possess some specific 
attributes to be counted as an instance of the particular concept. 
 Moreover, there are experimental and theoretical findings connected 
with so-called explanation-, or knowledge-, based approach to concepts. 
These findings have suggested that for specifying a particular concept C 
we need the information not only about the corresponding ground set and 
its members, but also about relations of these members to the members of 
a set O(C) of other relevant objects. The set O(C) is specific for the con-
cept C.  
 Thus, modeling a concept, we should depict in model terms three 
kinds of information. The first one is on the concept ground set. The sec-
ond one is on some properties and attributes of elements and subsets from 
the ground set. The third one is on certain relations of members from 
G(C) to members of O(C). One way to do this is to use the construction 
of a set scale S(X).  
 Under the triplet concept modeling, the basis X of the corresponding 
concept set scale necessarily includes the ground set G (G = X1). To al-
low for the findings connected with the explanation-based view we in-
clude also the set O(C) in the basis X of a concept. It should be noted that 
the other contemporary views of concepts specify a concept without ref-
erence to the set O(C).  
 We may express any attribute associated with the ground set G(C) and 
the set O(C) by resources of the set scale with the appropriate basis. For 
this purpose the basis X should include auxiliary sets that are scales of 
attributes of elements from G and O. Examples of auxiliary sets are quali-
tative scales, real numbers, vector spaces, truth values, etc.  
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Definition 2. The potential base B*K(C) (in relation to the conditions K) 
of the concept C is the collection of elements of GK(C) and their at-
tributes that are necessary for the usage of C in conditions K.  
 Structures from finite number of levels of the set scale S(G*) represent 
these attributes. Here the basis G* is equal to {GK, X2 = O, X3,..., Xn}, 
where X3,..., Xn are auxiliary sets.  
 Eventually, we have centered the information about the concept base 
around the general ontological structuring (objects-attributes) of the real-
ity under study. The hypotheses about specific nature of concrete objects 
and their attributes concretize this structuring. Informally, the base in-
cludes the information about the world knowledge of a subject, that is his 
or her knowledge about the attributes and interaction of objects.  
 In other words, as viewed from a base, a concept is modeled ontologi-
cally not only by all instances that exemplify it, but also by (relevant in 
the conditions K) attributes of its instances.  
 The available concept views vary also in constraints on attributes as-
sociated with the concept potential base. To allow for these constraints 
we introduce the notion of a real concept base or simply a concept base. 
For example, a particular attribute may belong to all concept instances or 
only to some subset of instances.  
Definition 3. The (real) base BK(C) is generated by imposing specific 
constraints on the potential base B*K(C).  
 For simplicity's sake, in what follows we will consider constraints as a 
part of the conditions K.  
6. The Representing Part of a Concept 
Apparently, components from the concept ground set and their attributes 
do not themselves bear their names, descriptions, definitions, statements 
about them, etc. Such structures are human creations. Thus, any realistic 
concept model should allow for this fundamental fact. Without the loss of 
generality, we may speak of only about linguistic structures. Here we 
understand language in a very broad sense. The second triplet characteris-
tic of a concept -its representing part- deals with these linguistic struc-
tures.  
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 Let us assume that we use some language L with the alphabet A, the 
vocabulary V, the set P of word combinations, the set E of expressions 
(sentences), and the set T of texts. The language L may include sublan-
guages (sign, pictorial, natural, artificial, common, scientific, mathemati-
cal, etc.). The basis L* of set scale S(L*) of language L is {A, V, P, E, T}. 
The set scale S(L*) contains everything expressible in the language L.  
Definition 4. The representing part RK(C) ⊆ S(L*) of the concept C is a 
set of linguistic structures by which the base BK(C) of a concept C is 
depicted (mapped, represented) under conditions K in some intelligent 
system.  
 For example, the representing part of pre-scientific concept PLANET 
contains some descriptions of images of huge pieces of matter moving 
round a star. The representing part of its scientific counterpart includes 
material points of classical mechanics and various theoretical models of 
planets.  
 Structures from the concept representing part differ in their representa-
tive and expressive capacity. Some of them only denote the ground set as 
a whole or its selected subsets or its individual elements. Other structures 
designate attributes from the base. The third group of structures provides 
the relatively complete and/or exact description of elements from the 
ground set or even their attributes. The fourth group models attributes in 
question.  
 In this paper, we consider only structural aspects of the concept repre-
senting part. It should be mentioned in this connection that any "formal" 
structure may be interpreted in various ways. For example, T is possible 
to interpret as a description, an explanation, a definition, a theory.  
7. The Linkage of a Concept  
Various (conscious and unconscious, mental and physical) processes and 
operations associate the base components with the appropriate represent-
ing structures. In this sense, such associations are outcomes of human 
activity. They depend on developmental levels of civilization, culture, 
language, science, the person's knowledge, maturity, purposes and mental 
capacities. These associations are conditional and ephemeral, but neces-
sary for building (forming) and functioning concepts. Thus, we should 
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provide a careful characterization of links between base components and 
representing structures.  
 Let we point out only some aspects of these links. There are many 
ways to establish them: by custom, by training, by language acquisition, 
by convention, by analogy, by procedure, etc. The almost commonly ac-
cepted approach treats these links as simple naming relations. Represent-
ing structures play the role of names and base components play the role 
of entities named by the appropriate former structures. However, these 
links are not all reducible to naming relations that assign the names to the 
entities. For example, if the representing part contains mathematical 
model of an attribute, then this model usually not only names the attrib-
ute, but also conveys the knowledge about its values.  
 We may separate various kinds of links under consideration. Among 
them are reference links (naming, denoting, describing, visualizing, im-
aging), truth and modeling links.  
Definition 5. The linkage LinK(C) of a concept C is a system of links be-
tween the base components from BK(C) and the representing structures 
from RK(C).  
 It should be mentioned that enormously complex (sensual, perceptual, 
mental, scientific, etc.) activity generates this linkage for any concept. 
For example, the linkage of the common concept ANIMAL has been par-
tially established by sensual perception (for animals that really were ob-
served by a subject), pictures, photos (for "rare" animals). For the syn-
onymous scientific concept we construct such a linkage in the framework 
of the available scientific knowledge, observational and measurement 
data.  
 For many scientific concepts, we may "control" some constituents of 
the linkage. In particular, with the help of measurement and calculation 
procedures scientists attach quite specific linguistic and mathematical 
(numeric, vector, etc.) values to some attributes of concept instances. The 
concept linkage is changing with the changes in scientific equipment, 
methods of its use, and available scientific theories.  
8. The Triplet Model of a Concept 
From stated above we obtain  
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Definition 6. Under conditions K the triplet model TrK(C) of the concept 
C is the triple (BK(C), LinK(C), RK(C)), where BK(C) is a base of C, 
RK(C) is a representing part of C, and LinK(C) is a linkage between 
BK(C) and RK(C).  
 Informally, to characterize a concept C we need to describe, at least, 
three kinds of information. The first one is the information about BK(C), 
that is about classes or sets of "naked" objects ("what C represents") and 
also about their attributes relevant in the conditions K. The second kind is 
the information about RK(C), that is about structures of representation of 
BK(C) in some intelligent system. The third kind is the information about 
LinK(C), i.e. about the ways, operations and procedures of matching (cor-
responding, juxtaposing) components from BK(C) and structures from 
RK(C).  
 It should be noted that the triplet model is an abstract model of general 
structure of a concept. To apply this model to a particular concept we 
should concretize or, metaphorically speaking, to fill its formal structures 
with a content. Only few triplet substructures characterize any particular 
concept in the conditions K. We would like also to stress that the specific 
treatment of a concept depends not only on a concept itself, but also on 
subject's approach to it.  
 Let us mention briefly the problem of concept identity. If we have two 
particular concepts each of which is characterized by the same triplet 
structure Str, then we say that they are Str-identical. The concepts may 
have a specific list List = {...,Strm,...} of the common structures Strm. In 
such a case, we speak of List-identical concepts.  
 Introducing different types of concept identity allows us to be more 
conscious about the situation of concept identity. For example, concepts 
may have the same ground set (G or the extension), that is to be G-
identical. However, from this does not follow that G-identical concepts 
are Str-identical relative to an arbitrary triplet structure Str. Thus, the 
triplet analysis avoids the well-known problem of identifying the concept 
with its characteristics (extension, names, attributes and so forth). The 
concepts may have the same triplet structure, but differ due to other non-
identical triplet structures.  
 From the point of view on concepts as special carriers of specifically 
ordered and organized information, it means that in various conditions we 
may associate context-relative knowledge with concepts. Practically, in a 
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particular situation of concept usage we need only the limited amount of 
specific and situation relative conceptual information.  
9. Structures Associated with a Concept in the Triplet Model 
In the subsequent discussion we will consider some main current models 
of a concept and concept structures introduced by them. We will show 
that all these structures have been also separated in the triplet model.  
 We may speak about several principles of the triplet analysis of con-
cepts:  
- the principle of limitation of the subject's knowledge, according to 
which a subject associates with a concept only limited number of 
triplet structures;  
- the principle of relevant choice, according to which in the condi-
tions K only specific triplet structures become to be actualized;  
- the principle of graded deepness, according to which there are vari-
ous degrees of completeness and precision in representing chosen 
structures.  
 From here on we limit ourselves only to the demonstrations that struc-
tures introduced by other models are among structures introduced by the 
triplet model. It means that our main concern will be structural aspects of 
concept modeling. In this paper, we will leave aside the consideration of 
pragmatic, descriptive, psychological and other concept aspects.  
 In the Table 1, we list some triplet structures of two concrete concepts.  
 
The name of a triplet 
structure 
Examples for the concept 
 ROBIN PLANET 
Structures of the concept ground set  
The ground set  The set of all robins The set of all 
planets 
The cardinality of the 
ground set  
Indefinite finite number 
 
A subset of the ground 
set  
The set of all garden variety 
robins  
The set of all 
planets of the 
Solar system  
The cardinality of a 
subset of the ground set 
Indefinite finite number 9 
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An element of the 
ground set  
A concrete robin  Mars 
Components of the concept base  
Attributive properties 
of all elements from 
the ground set=necessary 
properties  
wing-bearing biped (two-legged) 
small size specific shape 
mass size visual 
color magnetic 
field  
Attributive properties 
of subsets of the ground 
set=non-necessary 
properties 
specific features of all garden 
variety robins 
to have satel-
lite(s)  
Relational properties 
of all elements from 
the ground set  
sexual reproduction of robins mutual distance 
between planets 
relative velocity 
of planets 
Relations among proper-
ties or interproperty 
relations  
correlations among properties Kepler's laws  
Relational properties 
of attributive properties 
of all elements 
from the ground set 
similarity in shape of robins density of plan-
ets 
Relational properties 
of subsets of properties 
of some elements from 
the ground set 
family resemblance between sets 
of properties of different subspe-
cies of robins 
family resem-
blance between 
different sub-
groups of plan-
ets 
Attributive properties 
of relational properties 
of all elements from 
the ground set 
necessity of sexual reproduction 
of robins  
positiveness of 
the mutual dis-
tance between 
planets 
Combinations (sets) of 
properties sufficient 
for recognition (in 
conditions K) of some 
objects as instances of a 
concept (usually, these 
properties are called 
sufficient) 
birdhood (birdiness) smallness 
brown back and wings red back  
 
relative to im-
movable stars 
and regular 
moving enough 
big mass revolv-
ing round a star  
Values of a property  height of robins in centimeters  mass of planets 
in tons  
Concept representing structures  
Simple and complex 
names of base 
components  
"robin", "garden variety robin", 
"small bird", "color", "size" 
"planet", 
"Mars", "small 
planet", "mass" 
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Informal and formal 
models of base 
components  
The model of a property P as 
(i) a linguistic predicate ("x is small") 
(ii) a logical predicate (P(x) → {0,1}) 
(iii) an abstract property (P(x) = (D, p, S), 
where D is a set of names of objects which 
may have the property in question, S is a 
scale of the property, and p is a partial func-
tion ascribing the value(s) of the property to 
an object)  
(iv) a mathematical function P(x) = f(x), where 
f(x) is real twice differentiable function) 
(v) a composition of functions (P(x) = f(x)g(x), 
where f(x) and g(x) are some mathematical 
functions) 
(vi) .............. 
Definitions and des- 
criptions of base 
components 
"a common small European bird 
with a brown back and wings and 
a red front" 
"a large body in 
space that 
moves round a 
star, esp. round 
the sun" 
The linkage as a collection of constituents connecting base components and rep-
resenting structures  
Naming  Ascribing the name a "robin" to 
the subset of birds through lan-
guage acquisition and socializa-
tion 
Ascribing the 
name a "planet" 
to the subset of 
celestial bodies 
through acquisi-
tion of astro-
nomical knowl-
edge and obser-
vation proce-
dures 
Modeling  A robin as a bird with specific 
biological and behavioral features 
and habits 
A planet as a 
material point of 
classical me-
chanics 
Determination of 
values of structures 
from the base 
Visual evaluation of size of robins Measurement 
and calculation 
procedures of 
determination of 
mass value of 
planets 
Table 1. Certain triplet structures of concrete concepts 
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10. The triplet components of the main concept models in cognitive psy-
chology  
In what follows, we will shortly characterize several main concept views 
and concept structures introduced by them. Our objective is not to ana-
lyze the empirical validity of the proposed concept models or their theo-
retical consistency. We are going only to "extract" structures that those 
models associate with concepts and to show that these structures are in-
cluded also in the triplet model.  
 We do not pretend to be too formal and limit ourselves only to an in-
formal set-theoretical characterization of conceptual structures. Here we 
will not consider the quantitative aspects of the triplet model connected, 
for example, with some numerical characterization of property values, the 
so called weighted attributes, prediction of reaction times in sentence 
verification tasks, etc.  
 According to the experts (Smith and Medin; Komatsu) in current psy-
chology there are five views on concepts: the classical, the family resem-
blance, the exemplar, the schema and the explanation-based. They vary in 
the nature and kind of information associated with a concept. As a rule, it 
is information about which constitutive attributes should possess objects 
to be counted as instances of a concept in question.  
 To illustrate the concept views, we will take again the concepts 
ROBIN and PLANET.  
 According to the classical view, these concepts represent (or consist 
of) information about the necessary and sufficient attributes (properties 
and relations) of, respectively, robins and planets. Examples of necessary 
attributes are wing-bearing for "normal" robins and mass for planets.  
According to the family resemblance view, the concepts ROBIN and 
PLANET are pieces of summary information about what robins and plan-
ets, on average, are like. Examples of such pieces of information (repre-
sentations) may be found in dictionaries, e.g., "a common small European 
bird with a brown back and wings and a red front" (see Longman 1992, p. 
904). This summary information is nothing but an informal description of 
a certain combination of attributes that any instance of a concept should 
possess. Frequently, scientific concepts include also descriptions of some 
relations between concept instances and other objects in the world. For 
example, such an informal description of a planet as "a large body in 
space that moves round a star" (see Longman 1992, p. 785) contains the 
reference to space and motion round a star.  
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 According to the exemplar view, the concept ROBIN (PLANET) con-
sists of the information of past exemplars of robins (planets) that a per-
son has experienced. It is possible to treat this information as a collection 
of pieces of information each of that corresponds to a particular robin 
(planet). In terms of attributes, the distinction between the family and 
exemplar views is as follows. In the former case, the description is built 
by means of the notion of a attribute that belongs to a set of objects. In 
the latter case, the description is built only by means of the notion of a 
attribute value. In other words, the particular exemplar information is the 
description of a combination of property values that a particular object 
possesses.  
 According to the schemata view, the concept ROBIN (PLANET) con-
sists both of information about robin (planet) exemplars and of informa-
tion about what robins (planets), on average, are like. Evidently, here a 
concept includes both family resemblance and exemplar information. 
Each concept instance is characterized by its specific combination of at-
tributes and combination of its appropriate attributes values. The former 
combination is shared by all concept instances. The latter is supposed to 
be unique for a particular instance.  
 Finally, according to the explanation-based view, the concept ROBIN 
(PLANET) includes two kinds of information. The first one is the infor-
mation about the relationships that hold among different attributes of 
robins (planets). The second one is the information about how robins 
(planets) interact with the other (relevant) objects in the world. As a rule, 
these kinds of information are not perceptually given, but are outcomes 
of processing some knowledge systems.  
 This informal description of the main concept views has shown that 
they constructed mainly for the concepts of everyday objects taken in the 
situations of their recognition and classification.  
 After this general characterization of concept views, let us single out 
structures they assign to concepts.  
 The Classical View 
 Figuratively speaking, this view states that a concept is defined by 
(information of) individually necessary and collectively sufficient attrib-
utes of its instances. If we use the triplet model, then it means that this 
view associates with a concept a certain set of the first order attributes of 
concept instances and also some combination of the second order attrib-
utes of instances (namely, attributes like the individual necessity and col-
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lective sufficiency of instance properties). From the stated above, it fol-
lows that all these structures are among structures of the concept triplet 
base. These structures appear under the appropriate choice of auxiliary 
sets and levels of the concept base.  
 An attribute may be an ordinary (sharp) as well as fuzzy attribute (cf. 
Burgin and Kuznetsov 1993). The latter case opens a way for considering 
the fuzzy membership of objects in the ground set of a concept.  
 Next, researchers usually suppose that the information about classical 
view attributes of concept instances has the form of definition. It means 
that this view uses such a triplet structure as a definition from the repre-
senting part of a concept. It seems also that this view also uses names of 
objects and their attributes.  
 The classical view says nothing about the concept linkage. The same 
is true for other concept models.  
 The Family Resemblance View  
 The notion of "family resemblance" is rather vague. It is possible to 
give various interpretations. Generally, the family resemblance view re-
jects the idea that all instances of a particular concept possess the same 
set of individually necessary and collectively sufficient attributes. In-
stead, this view states that the extension (the ground set or the category) 
of a concept is constituted due to so-called family resemblance relation-
ship. It may be described as follows.  
 Let us suppose that G is decomposed in subsets G1,..., Gq. Members of 
each subset Gj have a collection Pj of attributes {P1(Gj),..., Pm(Gj)}, and 
none of the attributes is common to all members of G. We say that there 
is family resemblance among these subsets if the intersection of collec-
tions of attributes for any two subsets is non-void. Members of the set 
Gpro come to be viewed as prototypical of G in proportion to the extent to 
which they share some common (specific for any other subset) attributes 
with all other subsets.  
 From this description of the family resemblance view, we may con-
clude that all its structures have triplet analogues. Indeed, in this case we 
should assume that G is decomposed in subsets with members character-
ized by a specific collection of attributes. The relations between these 
collections are constrained by the demand of family resemblance. This 
may be done by an appropriate choice of decomposition of G and rela-
tions among its subsets.  
 20 
 Concerning the representing structures using by the family resem-
blance view, we mention that this view prefers not definitions, but de-
scriptions of attributes of subsets of G and relationships among them.  
 The Exemplar View 
 Both the classical and family resemblance views start from the notion 
of an attribute. Here, it is usually supposed that an attribute belongs to 
more than one object. However, these views vary in the ways of the dis-
tribution of attributes constitutive for a concept among objects from the 
concept extension. In the former case, a particular attribute characterizes 
every instance, while in the latter case it characterizes typically only 
some instances, that is a certain subset of G. The exemplar view speaks 
about the so-called unique attributes which are attributes that are unique 
to specific instances of a concept. Attributes that are constitutive for a 
particular concept need not hold true for more than one instance.  
 It seems that using the model of an attribute as an abstract property, 
we may explicate the situation as follows. Let us remind that according to 
this model, an attribute is characterized through three components (DK, p, 
Sc). From the point of view of this model, the above considered concept 
views have used in a sense different reduced notions of an attribute. The 
classical and family resemblance views have emphasized on the first 
component stressing that an attribute is shared among members of some 
non-void set. Other two attribute components are beyond of using by 
these views. The exemplar view accented the possibility of unique indi-
vidualization of a concept instance by means of assigning the unique at-
tribute value (or unique combinations of values of various attribute) to it. 
However, this view refuses to consider an attribute as a whole entity con-
sisting of three components. In the light of this, the exemplar view asso-
ciates with a concept only information about attribute values and leaves 
aside information about the set DK of objects that may possess this attrib-
ute. In contrast to this, the first two concept views associate with a con-
cept only information about the set DK and leave aside information about 
attribute values (from Sc) by means of which it is possible to individual-
ize different instances. These views do not care about the procedures (p) 
of assigning specific attribute values to particular concept instances.  
 The Schemata View 
 At first glance (Komatsu 1992, p. 510), the schemata may be treated 
as a single structure that captures characteristics of both the family re-
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semblance view (by storing information that is abstracted across sets of 
instances from G) and the exemplar view (by retaining unique informa-
tion about actual instances). It means that the schemata information about 
a concept combines the family resemblance information and exemplar 
information. Above we characterize the family information as informa-
tion about the set DK, i.e. only about the first component of attribute. We 
describe also the exemplar information as information about the members 
of the scale Sc, i.e. only about the third component of an attribute. Thus, 
the schemata information is information both about the set DK and the 
members of the scale Sc. This information characterizes more completely 
attributes constitutive for a concept. Indeed, what go under the names of 
slots, and slot values are nothing but attributes and attribute values.  
 Closer examination of the schemata view shows that it operates with 
additional conditions on attributes as well. Among them are specifica-
tions of values that can and cannot fill each slot/role (attribute) and the 
probability distribution of values that the slot may be filled with. In the 
terms of an abstract property, the first specification deals with the scale of 
values specific for a given attribute, while the second specification deals 
with relations among unique values of various attributes. The latter speci-
fication naturally extends to the specification of relationships among slots 
(attributes) and the description of schemata as networks. In triplet terms, 
this means that we should consider not only different combinations of 
attributes of concept instances, but also relations among these combina-
tions. Under the appropriate choice of the concept base, all these struc-
tures may find the proper place in it. 
 Additionally, according to Rumelhart (1980), the schemata informa-
tion about a concept includes information how conceptual information is 
to be manipulated. This condition correlates with using in the schemata 
view some formalization of the notion of an attribute in terms of slot/role 
and slot values. The concept views discussed above use the informal no-
tion of an attribute and take for granted that this notion is manipulated by 
resources and tools of common knowledge and natural language. Thus, 
the schemata view uses explicitly such a structure as some formal model 
of a property.  
 The Explanation-Based View 
 According to this concept view a concept includes information about 
how that concept is related to other concepts (or how its instances relate 
to other objects) and about the relationships -especially the functional, 
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causal, or explanatory- that hold among the attributes associated with its 
instances (Komatsu 1992, p. 515).  
 This view also holds that the information constitutive for a concept is 
the information about attributes of concept instances. We can interpret 
this quotation as follows. First, the information about relations of a given 
concept to other concepts may be treated as the information about rela-
tions of constitutive attributes of the former concept to constitutive at-
tributes of other concepts. Second, the information about relationships 
that hold among attributes of concept instances is the information com-
prised in a model of instances.  
 Let us consider a possible triplet interpretation of structures associated 
with this description of the explanation-based view. According to it, the 
concept base includes not only attributes of elements from the ground set 
G, but also their relations to elements from the set O of other relevant 
objects. Thus, for the explanation-based specification of a particular con-
cept we also should consider other objects and their relations to the in-
stances of this concept. Additionally, the base contains also relations 
among attributes of concept instances. All these structures are generated 
by an appropriate choice of the basis {GK, X2 = O, X3,..., Xn} of the set 
scale and constraints. 
 Moreover, the explanation-based view supposes that the information 
about attributes constitutive for a given concept has stored not only in a 
form of directly accessible names and descriptions of components from 
the concept base. Typically, to extract this information a subject should 
make some processing of the concept representing part. It means that the 
information vital for the decision making about the membership of an 
object to the concept extension is an outcome of specific processing 
available components of the concept representing part.  
 The triplet model may be modified to accommodate this. Before pro-
ceeding to a modification, we should change a mode of the triplet de-
scription of the concepts representing part. Definition 4 characterized it 
from the point of view of expressing its structures by means of the forms 
of some language L with the alphabet A, the vocabulary V, the set P of 
word combinations, the set E of expressions (sentences), and the set T of 
texts. Any of these language structures may be a carrier of information 
constitutive for a concept.  
 It is an assumption of the classical, family resemblance, exemplar and 
schemata views of concepts that this information is ready for use and it is 
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actualized during the access to it. The explanation-based view rejects this 
assumption and states that, at least in some cases of concept usage in rec-
ognition, this information is obtained by means of some inference proc-
esses over relevant and pre-stored information.  
 From this point of view, the representative structures of the concept 
representing part may be divided into two classes. The first class consists 
of structures supposed to be directly accessible. These structures are sub-
jects of inference processes and their processing creates structures from 
the second class. The latter structures are accessible only through some 
transforming of the former structures.  
 Let us consider briefly two illustrative examples. For common con-
cepts, we may speak about such structures from the first class as informal 
descriptions, beliefs, pieces of intuitive knowledge, etc. They have been 
operated on processes associated with ordinary discourse. For scientific 
concepts structures from the first class may be definitions, initial proposi-
tions, postulates, axioms, theorems that have been operated on processes 
of scientific argumentation (deduction, induction, etc.). In either case, the 
second class consists of derived structures that used in decision making 
about membership of presented objects to the concept extension.  
 There are eight main ways of doing the modification of the triplet 
model of concepts. In either case, the concept representing part should be 
divided into classes of initial (directly accessible) and derived (indirectly 
accessible) structures. These ways may be described by two criteria each 
of that has two values. The first criterion deals with an inclusion or non-
inclusion of (deductive, abductive, inductive, explanatory and others) 
processes and structures by means of which the derivation takes place in 
the concept representing part. The second criterion deals with particular-
ity or generality of derivation processes and structures. In the former 
case, the derivation processes are supposed to be unique for a given con-
cept, while in the latter case they are supposed to be shared by many con-
cepts of the same kind.  
 Thus, compared to other views, the explanation-based view elaborates 
more carefully the idea that the concept representing part is "immersed" 
in the available knowledge systems. Figuratively speaking, to make a 
decision about the membership of objects to the extension of a given 
concept, we need not only description-like information about object at-
tributes and corresponding attribute values. We should realize some 
processes that involve transformations of this information and lead to 
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relevant and non-evident consequences. According to this view, the con-
cept representing part is not a simple disjoint collection of homogeneous 
names and descriptions of components from the concept base. This part is 
characterized also by relevant relationships between different kinds of 
names and descriptions, which correspond to the different base compo-
nents.  
11. Perspectives 
The triplet model of concepts may be applied in the classification of con-
cepts and concept relations, in determining the maturity degrees of differ-
ent concepts, in study of types and trends of concept developments, in 
analysis of knowledge organization at the level of concepts, etc.  
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